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In the last few decades in the United States birth rates have declined and longevity has risen while 
productivity growth has slowed.  Given such changes, the increasing burden of funding programs for the 
elderly is likely to shift resources away from the young and toward the elderly.  This paper uses an 
overlapping generations framework to examine the effects of tax policies on an aging economy.  We find 
that if the quality of the education system is sufficiently high then raising the education tax rate and 
subsequently lowering the social security tax rate enhances growth and welfare. 
 
JEL Codes: D9, E6, H2, I2 
Keywords: education, social security, endogenous growth 
 
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, or of the Federal Reserve System. 
1.  Introduction  
 The demographic profile of the United States is undergoing profound change. Birth rates are falling 
and longevity is increasing.  As a result the elderly are projected to comprise an increasing proportion of the 
population.  This has led to an increasing focus on issues relevant to the welfare of the elderly, such as 
Social Security.  Meeting the demands of an aging population may, at the same time, reduce resources 
allocated to the young, such as education expenditures. 
 In this paper we extend Pecchenino and Utendorf (1999) to examine the interconnections between 
funding for programs benefiting the elderly, represented by Social Security, and funding for programs 
benefiting the young, represented by public education.  We utilize a Diamond (1965) style overlapping 
generations model to analyze possible intergenerational linkages.  In our model growth, along the transition 
or balanced growth paths, is endogenously fueled by individuals’ investments in both physical capital, to 
fund their retirements, and human capital, to fund their children’s education, and by the government’s 
investment in human capital via public education expenditures.  Individuals face uncertainty over their 
longevity.  All old agents receive social security benefits, which are funded in a pay-as-you-go manner.  We 
examine how policies aimed at a specific target group, e.g. the elderly or the young, affect current and 
future welfare of the economy as a whole.   
 Our model is similar in construct to Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999), which also examines the effects 
of the public funding of social security and education on economic growth.  They, as we, find that shifting 
tax revenues from social security benefits to education can be welfare improving.  We, however, take the 
constraints of the social security system (that benefits are determined as a replacement rate on wages, so 
benefits determine taxes) explicitly into account in our analysis.  In addition, we assume that the 
government, effectively, faces two budget constraints: a social security constraint and an education 
constraint, rather than the unified constraint with the explicit tradeoff (more for social security implies less 
for education) assumed by Kaganovich and Zilcha.  Further, our model incorporates uncertainty over the 
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length of life as well as population growth, allowing us to analyze the demographic transition, an important 
issue completely ignored in their analysis.1  
 The connection between social security and education is also central to a model sketched in 
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999).  In this model social security is an explicit return when old on 
investments made in the human capital of the young and is a formalization of the observation found in 
Pogue and Sgontz (1977) and Becker and Murphy (1988) that social security is a dividend paid to the old 
for investing in the human capital of the current workers when they were young.  Our model differs in that 
we do not make this political linkage since in practice Social Security is a Federal program while education 
is by and large a local program.     
Our model differs from many models of social security (see, for example, Diamond (1977), 
Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995) among others) in that these models ignore child welfare when 
assessing the effects of various social security programs.  Other work, while neither ignoring children nor 
education, makes expenditures on children exogenous, as in Wildasin (1991), or claims that human capital 
formation is independent of direct expenditures on children so that parent’s decisions concerning their 
children’s education are not important to the analysis, as in Sala-i-Martin (1996). In still other work 
education decisions are central to the analysis, as in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), while abstracting from 
any spillovers of these decisions on the utility of the aged.  In our model the interactions between social 
security programs and expenditures on children’s education play a central role through the effects of 
education on individual and aggregate productivity. 
We model education as being utility enhancing for parents and productivity enhancing for the 
individual and society.  Given our assumption of representative individuals we exclude the possibility of 
education as a signal, as in Spence (1973).  We instead concentrate on the effects of the quality of education 
on individual and social welfare where middle-aged individuals value education for their children's sake and 
these children are rewarded by a higher market return for their labor.  That the quality of education a child 
gets matters, both in terms of the market return to schooling and parental utility, is supported by empirical 
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studies such as Hanushek (1986), Card and Krueger (1990), Ehrenberg et al. (1989), and Altonji and Dunn 
(1995) and by the casual empiricism that parents often relocate to "good" school districts. 
Because education is productivity enhancing, it provides the impetus for growth in our model.  This 
connection between education and growth has its roots in the work of Schultz (1961) and the more recent 
theoretical work of Lucas (1988), Rebelo (1991) and others who, building on Schultz's insight, suggest that 
human capital formation as evidenced by educational attainment is an important ingredient in explaining 
economic growth.  This theoretical position is supported empirically by Barro and Lee's (1993) analysis.  
Hanushek and Kim (1996) extend this analysis, providing evidence that not only does the amount of 
schooling matter but so does the quality of that schooling.  Since education may be growth inducing the 
failure to adequately provide for and educate children may lead to slower growth or economic decline.  Our 
model allows us to explore this possibility. 
Analysis of our model yields the following results.  In the steady-state representations, increases in 
the social security tax rate leads to reductions in physical and human capital accumulation, output and the 
rate of balanced growth while the opposite may be true for increases in the education tax rate.  Increases in 
life expectancy increase capital accumulation, output and the rate of balanced growth if the positive 
longevity effect overwhelms the negative tax and bequest effects.  These results suggest that there is the 
potential for Pareto-improving changes in tax policy.  Using a balanced-growth version of the model we 
show that in an aging economy if the efficiency of public expenditures on education is sufficiently high 
increasing public expenditures on education is both growth and welfare enhancing.  Thus, shifting public 
resources toward the young may benefit all generations.   
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2.  The Model 
Preliminaries 
 The model developed below is an extension of Pecchenino and Utendorf (1999),2 and is similar to 
Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999). There is an infinitely-lived economy composed of finitely-lived individuals, 
firms, and a government.  A new generation is born at the beginning of each period and lives for at most 
three periods divided into youth, middle age, and old age.  At each period t, N(t) identical agents of 
generation t enter workforce.  The workforce grows at the rate [  ).(1)]1(/)( tntNtN =−−
 
Consumers 
 At date t, agents in the first period of their lives, the young, do not consume, nor do they produce.  
They are, however, endowed with one unit of time that they combine inelastically with resources provided 
by their parents, e(t), and the government, , to develop their human capital, h)(te g t+1(t+1).  Agents in the 
second period of their lives, the middle-aged, supply their effective labor, the product of their one unit of 
time and their human capital developed in youth, inelastically to firms, for which they receive wage income, 
w(t)ht(t).  They divide their after social security tax, τ(t), and school tax, ω(t), wage income plus any 
bequests, B(t), they may receive, tax free, from their parents, between funding their children’s human 
capital development, e(t), their current consumption, ct(t), and saving, s(t), for consumption when old, 
ct(t+1).  Agents in the final period of their lives, the old, supply their savings, s(t-1), inelastically to firms 
and consume their social security benefits, T(t), and the return to their savings, (1+ρ(t))s(t-1).  With 
probability p(t-1) an agent who worked during period t-1 will live throughout old age, and with probability 
(1-p(t-1)) the agent will die at the onset of old age.  If an agent dies at the onset of old age, his saving is 
bequeathed to the members of generation t, )1()]}(1/[)](1{[ −++= tstnt)(tB ρ . 
 Let the preferences of a representative middle-aged worker at time t be represented by 
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  (1) 1)+(thtn +  1)+(tctp + (t)c = U tttt 1ln)]1(1[ln)(ln +++δ
Parents get utility from consumption and from educating their children, the value of this education is 
summarized by the child’s human capital.  This utility is derived from an altruistic link between parent and 
child, that is their “love of” or “duty to” their children rather than any personal return they may reap from 
their investment or any other strategic motive (see Cremer, et al., 1992).  This inter vivos bequest motive 
encompasses the lifetime bequest motive.3 Since agents do not know when they will die, additional 
unintentional bequests may be forthcoming.4,5  
Parental and government human capital investments are both are essential for human capital 
formation.  If a parent invests e(t) in his child, and the government invests , then the child’s human )(te g
capital will be 
  (2) )()(1 21 )()()1(
tgt
tt teteth
θθ
=++
where the parameters θ1(t) and θ2(t) measure the elasticity of parental and government expenditures on 
human capital, respectively.  This method of modeling educational attainment follows Hanushek’s (1992) 
achievement function.  Family and school expenditures, e(t) and , respectively, as well as the )(te g
efficiency of those expenditures, θ1(t) and θ2(t), which determine the quality of the component of education 
received from one’s parent and the government, respectively, matter for human capital development.  The 
utility a parent receives from his dependent children’s human capital is  where 
δ is the discount factor. 
),1(ln)]1(1[ 1 +++ + thtn tδ
The representative agent takes as given his human capital, wages, return on saving, the social 
security and education tax rates, social security benefits, bequests, and government expenditures on 
education.  The agent then chooses saving and education expenditures to maximize lifetime utility as given 
by equation (1) subject to (2) and the following budget constraints 
  (3) 
)+T(t + s(t))+(t+1 = )+(tct 1]1[1 ρ
)()]1(1[)()]1(1[)()]()(1)[()()( tBtptetntsttthtwtc tt −−+++−−ω−τ−=
  (4) 
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where constraint (3) encompasses the assumption that bequests are allocated equally across all members of 
a generation so that the bequest dependent wealth distribution is uniform, as in Hubbard and Judd (1987).  
This assumption allows us to conduct a representative agent analysis, and restricts uncertainty to the timing 
of death alone. 
The first-order conditions for this maximization problem, with respect to s(t) and e(t), respectively, 
are 
 
tt
 (5) 
01 1 =
δθ
+−
0
)1(
)]1(1)[(
)(
1
=
+
+ρ+
+−
tc
ttp
tc
 
t
. (6) 
)()( tetc
Utility is maximized by equating the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and saving with the 
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and parental expenditures on their children’s human 
capital development. 
 
Firms 
 The firms are perfectly competitive profit maximizers that produce output using the production 
function Y(t) = , α ∈ (0, 1).  K(t) is the capital stock at t, which depreciates fully in the αα −1)()()( tHtKtA
production process.  H(t) is the effective labor input at t, H(t) = N(t)ht(t), where N(t) is labor hours.   A(t) > 
0 is a productivity scalar.  The production function can be written in intensive form  
   (7) αα )()()()( 1 tkthtAty t
−
=
where y (t) is output per worker and k(t) is the capital labor ratio. 
 Since firms are competitive they take the wage, w(t), and rental rate, R(t), as given.  The firms then 
hire labor and capital up to the point where their marginal products equal their factor prices. 
  (8)  w(t)= k(ttt)h)A-(1 t
- ααα ))((
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  (9)
  
R(t) = k(tthA(t t
-1 1))() −ααα
The Government 
 The government administers the social security program and funds education.  It levies proportional 
income taxes, τ(t) and ω(t), on the middle-aged to finance social and education expenditures, respectively.  
Social security benefits are specified as a replacement rate on current workers’ wages.  So,  
)()()1()( thtwttT t−= ξ  
where T(t) are the transfers to the old at date t and ξ(t-1) is the replacement rate on wages for agents in 
middle age at t-1.  There is no debt in the model so expenditures on social security and education must be 
fully funded through tax receipts at each period t.   Since total social security benefits to the old must be 
balanced by social security tax revenues 
 . (10) )()()()()(
)(1
)1()1()(
)(1
)1( thtwtthtw
tn
ttptT
tn
tp
tt τ
ξ
=
+
−−
=
+
−
Solving equation (10) for τ(t) yields 
 . (11) 
)(1
)1()1()(
tn
ttpt
+
−−
=
ξ
τ
That is, the government sets ξ(t-1) to achieve the desired level of social security benefits, T(t), for the old at 
t and the social security tax rate endogenously adjusts.  Since social security benefits “replace” not one’s 
own wages but one’s children’s wages, the old benefit from the human capital investments they made in 
their children during their working lives.  Total spending on education must equal total education tax 
revenues 
 . (12) )(
)1(1
)( tw(t)h
tn
t = (t)e t
g
++
ω
The Goods Market 
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The goods market clears when the demand for goods for either consumption or savings equals the 
supply of goods. 
 
)(1 tn+
 (13) )()()()()()](1[)()](1[)()()1()( 1 tktRthtwtetntetntstc
tptc t
g
tt +=+++++
−
+
−
Substituting equations (3), (4), (8), (9), (11) and (12) into (13), and making use of the fact that by arbitrage 
the return on capital must equal the return on saving 
  (14) (t) + 1 = R(t) ρ
yields 
 s(t-1)=[1+n(t)]k(t). (15) 
Savings at time t-1 determine the capital stock at time t. 
 
3.  Equilibrium 
Definition: A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of prices and taxes 
, a sequence of allocations { and a sequence of human and 
physical capital stocks, { , k(0), h∞
=0)}( ttk),(t th 0(0)>0 given, such that given population growth, agents and 
the government's expectations over longevity, and given these prices, allocations, and capital stocks, agents’ 
utility is maximized, firms’ profits are maximized, the government budget constraints are satisfied, and 
markets clear.  
∞
0=t(t)} (t), R(t), (t), {w(t), ωτρ ∞=+ 0)}1(),( ttt tctc
 Substituting equations (2)-(4), (8), (9), (11), (12), (14) and (15) into the first order conditions given 
by equations (5) and (6) results in the following set of difference equations in k(t+1), e(t) and 
predetermined variables.  
−

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The equilibrium is fully characterized by these difference equations. 
 
Steady-State and Balanced-Growth Equilibria 
 A steady-state equilibrium exists if the production function exhibits diminishing returns to all 
factors of production:  θ1+θ2<1.  A balanced-growth equilibrium exists if the production function exhibits 
constant returns to all factors of production:  θ1+θ2=1.  Assume that all time dependent parameters are time 
invariant, so x(t)=x for all parameters x.   Steady-state and balanced-growth solutions as well as the proofs 
of the following comparative static and dynamic results are found in the appendix. 6   
 
Proposition 1: Economies with higher social security replacement rates, ξ, have lower (higher) steady state 
physical and human capital stocks and output, or rates of balanced growth if  
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 The increase in the social security replacement rate, ξ, raises the social security tax rate thereby 
reducing the after-tax income of the middle-aged while increasing the social security benefits received by 
the elderly.  Both effects lead to a reduction in saving in terms of human capital and physical capital (the 
right hand side of the inequality).  The negative income effects are offset by a positive substitution effect on 
parental expenditures on education since, while they are proportional to saving, the factor of proportionality 
is increasing in the social security replacement rate (the left hand side of the inequality).  If the income 
effects dominate the substitution effect, the first inequality in the proposition is satisfied and the negative 
effects of higher social security replacement rates on both human and physical capital reduce steady-state 
output or the rate of balanced growth.  If the substitution effect is strong enough, then higher social security 
replacement rates can lead to increases in both human and physical capital, thus steady state output or the 
rate of balanced growth. 
 The inequalities in Proposition 1 can be solved to yield critical values of ξ in terms of the 
parameters of the model.  This involves solving a quadratic equation.  The restrictions implied do not lend 
themselves to intuitive interpretations.  However, searching the parameter space we find, for the baseline 
parameter values set out in Section 4, below, and letting α ≤.01 then for ξ ≤ .04 or > 3.5, that is outside the 
feasible parameter space,  increasing ξ leads to increases in both human and physical capital, thus steady 
state output or the rate of balanced growth.  Whether such parameter values are likely to be encountered in 
practice is an empirical question.   
  
Proposition 2: Economies with higher tax rates to finance education, ω, have higher (lower) steady-state 
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human and physical capital accumulation and output, or rates of balanced growth if 
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The education tax, ω, represents the marginal cost of public education while the marginal benefit to 
the taxpayer is the marginal increase in income in middle-age, [1-pξ/(1+n)](1-α)+(1-p)α, discounted by the 
marginal efficiency of the government’s educational input, θ2.  If the discounted marginal benefit exceeds 
the marginal cost, agents receive a positive steady-state income effect from an increase in the education tax 
rate, leading to increases in saving and investment in one’s children’s human capital.  However, if the 
marginal cost exceeds the discounted marginal benefit (where the discount factor is now the marginal 
efficiency of the government’s educational input relative to the sum of the marginal efficiency of 
government and parental educational inputs), that is ωω ~> , both saving and human capital investment fall, 
and with them output or the rate of balanced growth.  This suggests that simply throwing money at 
education may indeed have detrimental effects.  It also indicates, as Hanushek and Kim (1996) suggest, the 
economic benefits from education are higher the high the quality of the education, here measured by θ2. er is 
 
Proposition 3:  Economies with higher longevity, p, have higher (lower) physical and human capital stocks 
and output or rates of balanced growth if the longevity effect dominates (is dominated by) the bequest and 
social security tax effects:  
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 Increasing the expected life span has both negative and positive effects on saving.  The second 
bracketed right hand side term of the inequalities is the sum of the bequest and tax effects.  When agents 
live longer, then, all else equal (including the age of retirement), they consume a higher proportion of their 
savings and leave less to their children.  This implies a negative bequest effect, which reduces expected 
income for middle-aged agents, leading to reductions in saving.  Since social security taxes will increase as 
the population ages to keep the replacement rate constant, the middle-aged's income falls compounding the 
negative bequest effect with a negative tax effect.  But, a longevity effect, the left hand side of the 
inequality, leads to increased saving since the probability of surviving until retirement is now higher.   
 For parents investing in their children, the bequest and tax effects reduce their incomes, and the 
higher expected lifetime reduces the factor of proportionality linking saving in terms of physical capital 
with saving in terms of human capital.  Thus, parental education expenditures fall (the first bracketed term 
on the right hand side of the inequalities).  Consequently, as the age distribution becomes more skewed to 
the right, the conflict between providing for one’s children and for one’s own retirement intensifies.  
Clearly, the resultant reduction in parental education spending (as a proportion of saving in terms of 
physical capital) does not signify a reduction in parents’ concern for their children, but rather a rational 
response to the exigencies of a longer life.  Further, whenever the longevity effect is dominant since saving 
rises, parent’s education expenditures may rise, as will total expenditures on education.  Thus human capital 
accumulation will rise.  The positive effects of a longer life on both human and physical capital increase 
steady-state output or the rate of balanced growth. 
 Critical values of p can be found by solving a quadratic equation in p and other parameter values.  
Since interpretable conditions cannot be found, we search the parameter space for the critical values of p.  
For example, for the baseline parameter values set out in Section 4, below, for all parameters other than p, if 
p>.6 then an increase in p reduces human and physical capital accumulation and steady-state output or the 
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rate of balanced growth.  Here the effect of a longer life is inadequate to overcome negative tax, bequest, 
and education effects. 
 4. Demographics and Social Welfare 
 Propositions 1 and 2 together suggest that in this economy intergenerational transfers from the 
middle-aged to the old can reduce steady-state capital stocks, while intergenerational transfers from the 
middle-aged to the young can increase steady-state capital stocks.  Thus, if under the current tax code the 
steady-state physical and human capital stocks are too low relative to the social optimum, then Pareto 
improving tax changes may be possible.  These results may be confounded, however, by population aging.  
In this section we examine the implications of tax policy for an aging economy along a balanced growth
 There are two ways the population can age in this model.  Either p, the probability of living into old 
age, can increase, or n, the working-age population growth rate, can decrease.  The former, all else equal, 
leads to a permanently higher aged dependency ratio, while the latter leads to a higher aged dependency 
ratio o
 
path. 
nly in the transition to a new equilibrium working-age population growth rate. 
The results of the previous section suggest that in an aging economy growth may be enhanced 
through changes in tax policy that raise the education tax rate.  Whether or not welfare is enhanced by such
welfare in period t is  
 
tax changes depends on the social welfare function.  We define a set of social welfare functions7  such that 
 )(ln))1(1()(ln)1()(ln)( 11 thtntc
tptctW ttt +− +++
−
+= δν . (
)(1 tn+
18) 
If ν>1, then society as a whole puts greater value on the living standards enjoyed by the elderly than on the 
living standards of the young or the middle-aged.  This social valuation could be a result of the voting 
habits and political activity of the elderly.  This notion that the old have greater influence than their 
p artin (1999).  Or, it could be a opulation size would suggest is explored by Mulligan and Sala-i-M
reflection of a negative external effect on the welfare of the middle aged and young of low living standards 
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of the elderly.  Thus, while the young individually cannot affect this, society as a whole can.  
[Insert Table 1] 
To examine the effects of an aging economy on growth and welfare, we begin by calibrating the 
model to match the growth experience of the U.S. economy.  The initial values for the parameters in the 
model are given in Table 1.  Each period is a generation, which we set equal to 25 years.  The share of 
physical capital, α, is 0.30.  The weight given by parents, in their utility functions, to the human capital 
development of their children, δ, is 0.98.   The education tax rate, ω, is 7.4 percent which is the 1990 ratio 
of public expenditures on all levels of education to GDP adjusted for labor’s share in output  (OECD, 
1996).  The replacement rate, ξ, is 43 percent which is the rate for those retiring in 2000 who earned the 
average wage while working.8  The period population growth rate, n, is 50.8 percent – the increase in the 
number of workers contributing to the Social Security system between 1975 and 2000.  The ratio of Social 
Security beneficiaries to contributors in 2000 is 25.3 percent. Multiplying this number by the gross working 
age population growth rate, (1+n), gives the value for p.   For balanced growth θ1+θ2=1.  Thus, choosi9 ng θ2 
determines the value for θ1.  We begin by assuming that θ2=0.5. Finally we assume that ν, the social welfare 
weight on the utility of the elderly, is 5 since this implies that the pay as you go social security system is 
welfare improving given the economy’s current demographic structure. 
[Insert Table 2] 
Using these parameter values and setting the growth rate of the economy at 2.5 percent per year 
(85.4 percent per period), allows us to determine the value of the constant, A, in the production function.  
We then introduce aging into the population and re-simulate the model, keeping all other variables, 
including A, at their initial values. Aging implies a decline in n(t) and an increase in p(t-1).  Specifically, 
population growth slows beginning with the cohort entering the workforce in period j+1, n(j+1)<n(j).  In 
addition life expectancy rises beginning with generation j, p(j)>p(j-1).  Both of these factors result in a 
population (generation [j]).  Aging continues for three periods, at which point p(t) and n(t) remain constant.  
reduction in the size of the working age population (generation [j+1]) relative to the size of the retired 
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The decline in the population growth rate and rise in longevity correspond to the projections of the Board of 
Trustees, Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (1999), and are 
shown in Table 2.  
[Insert Table 3] [Insert Figure 1] 
 
Result 1: An aging population raises the growth rate of output per worker and increases welfare in the 
long-run relative to the baseline.  Welfare in the short-run falls relative to the baseline.  Furthermore, the 
share of the economy’s resources devoted to social security rises relative to the share devoted to public 
education. 
Aging increases both physical and human capital, and hence the growth rate of output per worker 
rises relative to the baseline, as shown in the second column of Table 3.  The initial (period j) effect of an 
increase in aging on welfare is negative (relative to the baseline), as shown in Figure 1, primarily as a result 
of the decrease in the population growth rate n(j+1).  Specifically, consumption of the middle-aged rises as 
the lower population growth rate reduces parental expenditures on children, although expenditures per child 
rise.  The human capital of each child, )(1 jh j+ , rises but the weight given to this generation in the welfare 
function falls, as n(j+1) decreases. The increased consumption of the middle-aged is not large enough to 
offset this negative effect and welfare in period t=j falls relative to the baseline.  Over time, however, the 
increase in the growth rate of output per worker, resulting from increased physical and human capital 
accumulation per worker, raises consumption for all generations, and hence welfare. 
The effects of aging on the share of output per worker devoted to social security and public 
education are indicated by the following two equations.  First, combining equations (7) and (10) and 
making use of equation (8) gives social security expenditures as a fraction of output per worker 
 )1)(1(
)(1)(
)()1(
αξ −−
+
=
−
t
tnty
tTtp
. )1()(1 −+ tptn (19) 
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Similarly, combining equations (7) and (12) and making use of equation (8) gives public education 
expenditures as a percent of output per worker 
)1)(()( −tte g αω =
[Insert Figure 2] 
)1(1)( ++ tnty
. (20) 
Both the decrease in n 
, holding ξ
th n expenditures on education and hence the relative share of output per worker 
and the increase in p result in a rise in the share of output per worker devoted to 
social security  constant, while the decline in n raises the share of output per worker devoted to 
public education, holding ω constant.   Because the increase in p only affects Social Security expenditures, 10
ese grow more rapidly tha
devoted to social security increases, as shown in the top panel of Figure 2. 
 We next examined the effects of reversing this shift in resources, that is shifting public expenditures 
toward education.  We consider two policies.  The first raises ω from 7.4 percent to 10 percent.  The second 
combines the increase in ω with a reduction in the social security tax rate.  The latter is achieved by 
reducing ξ from 43 percent to 33 percent.  We then examine the effects of these changes on growth and 
welfare relative to the economy absent any policy change.  
[Insert Figure 3] 
 
Result 2: In an aging economy, a permanent rise in the education tax rate from ω to ,ω such that ,ωˆ<ω  
raises the growth rate of output per worker and increases welfare.  The share of output per worker devoted 
to public education rises. 
 Increasing ω in period j reduces the income of the middle aged in that period (relative to income 
absent a change in ω) and hence lowers consumption of this group as well as parental expenditures on 
children.  Period j human capital expenditures rise, however, as the increase in spending on public 
education more than offsets the decline in parental expenditures.  As shown in the top panel of Figure 3, 
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overall welfare rises as the positive effect of the increase in human capital expenditures is greater than 
negative effect of the decline in consumption of the middle-aged.   
 Increasing ω also provides a productivity boost to the economy that raises the growth rate of output 
per worker, as shown in the first column of Table 3. The increase in ω has no effect on the share of output 
per worker devoted to social security while raising the share devoted to public education, as can been seen 
from equations (19) and (20).  Thus, overall government expenditures as a share of output per worker rise, 
as shown in the middle panel of Figure 2, as does the relative share of expenditures on public education. 
 
Result 3: In an aging economy, a permanent rise in the education tax rate in the education tax rate from ω 
to ,ω such that ,ωˆ<ω  followed by a permanent reduction in the social security replacement rate raises the 
growth rate of output per worker and increases welfare relative to no policy change.  Public education 
expenditures rise relative to social security expenditures, but total government expenditures as a share of 
ou  per wor   tput ker falls.
 As noted in Result 2, increasing ω raises welfare in all periods.  In contrast, while a decrease in ξ 
(holding ω fixed) will raise the long run growth rate of the economy and hence welfare, it lowers welfare in 
the short-run. Decreasing the replacement rate for generation j shifts their expenditures away from current 
consumption and spending on their children toward saving for retirement.  These two factors both lower 
consumption of the middle-aged and the young, reducing welfare in period j.  The subsequent increase in 
the capital stock in period j+1 in conjunction with the reduction in the social security tax rate, boosts 
consumption of the middle-aged and the young.  Consumption of the old, however, falls --    increased 
saving by generation j is not enough to compensate for the reduction in social security benefits.  Because of 
the high weight attached to the elderly in the social welfare function, the decrease in their consumption 
predominates and welfare in period j+1 falls.  By the following period, output per worker rises sufficiently 
to boost consumption for all three generations and welfare rises from then on.   Combining a period j 
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increase in ω with a decrease in the replacement rate for generation j (the old in period j+1) results in an 
increase in welfare in all periods.  While the lower ξ reduces consumption of the middle-aged and their own 
expenditures on their children, the increase in ω causes a sharp rise in the overall level of human capital 
expenditures ensuring a rise in welfare in period j.  In period j+1, consumption of the old falls, but now the 
increased human capital stock combined with the increase in the physical capital stock, both dampens this 
decline while boosting the consumption of both the middle-aged and young sufficiently to overcome the 
negative effect on welfare.  Hence welfare in all periods increases. 
 As equation (19) demonstrates, a decline in ξ lowers social security expenditures relative to output 
per worker, while as noted in Result 2, the increase in ω raises education expenditures relative to output per 
worker.  The overall share of government expenditures in output per worker falls and the share of education 
expenditures in the overall expenditures of the government rises relative to the no policy change.  This can 
be seen by comparing the top and bottom panels of Figure 2.  In order for this policy to be Pareto improving 
the increase in ω must precede the decline in the social security tax rate.  As a result, the ratio of 
government expenditures to output per worker rises in period j relative to this ratio in the no policy change 
scenario, before falling thereafter. 
 The strength of the altruistic bond between parents and their children and the productivity of 
government expenditures on education are of utmost importance in determining whether a change in tax 
policy is welfare improving. If either δ or θ2 is small then shifting government expenditures toward 
education is not Pareto improving since welfare in at least one period falls.11  A low δ implies that parents, 
and hence society, place little weight on the human capital development of the young.  Setting δ=.05 
e tes most of the inter-generational altruism in the model.  As shown in the middle panel of Figulimina re 3, 
when δ=0.05 raising ω alone or in combination with a decrease in ξ lowers welfare initially.  As noted in 
Result 2 increasing ω in period j reduces the consumption of the middle-aged while raising human capital 
expenditures on the young.   If the weight on the latter in the welfare functi n is low then the negative effeco t 
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dominates and welfare falls.  The effect is worsened by combining a rise in ω with a decrease in ξ since 
both reduce the consumption of the middle-aged while the latter decreases human capital expenditures on 
the young.   After the initial period, welfare rises as the increase in physical and human capital boosts 
output per worker (see the third column of Table 3) and hence consumption of all generations.   
 A low θ2 makes raising welfare through shifting government expenditures toward education even 
more problematic since it reduces the efficiency of these expenditures.  As shown in the bottom panel of 
Figure 3, when θ2=0.1 an increase in ω lowers welfare for all generations.  The efficiency of the additional 
expenditures on education is too low to provide a sufficient productivity boost to offset the drag on output 
resulting from the tax increase, and hence the growth rate of output per worker falls, as shown in the last 
column of Table 3.  If the increase in ω is combined with a decrease in ξ then the long-run growth rate of 
output per worker and hence welfare rises.  That is, the long-run effects on the economy of increased 
saving, as a result of the lower ξ, eventually offset the negative effects of the rise in ω.  Initially, however, 
the decline in ξ exacerbates the negative effects on consumption and welfare falls.   
5.  Conclusion 
 As a population ages there is increasing pressure to shift resources away from programs directly 
benefiting the young (education) and toward those directly benefiting the elderly (social security). The 
results of this paper indicate that such policies may be shortsighted.  Because of the productivity enhancing 
effects of education and the saving reducing effects of social security, growth and welfare can both be 
increased by increasing the resources dedicated to educating the young.   
 The key determinant of whether dedicating more resources to the young is growth enhancing is the 
quality of the education system, measured by the effectiveness of government expenditures on education.  
When the efficiency of public education expenditures is low the productivity gains from an increase in 
spending are slight and do not offset the reduction in social security benefits from the expenditure switching 
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policy for the initial generations. 
 The key determinants of whether dedicating more resources to the young is welfare enhancing in all 
periods are the quality of the education system and the degree of inter-generational altruism. Because the 
efficiency of government expenditures on education is linked with the growth rate of the economy it affects 
consumption and hence welfare.  In an economy that places little or no importance on the young, policies 
that shift public resources toward the young will result in initial declines in welfare as the first effects of 
such policies are to raise the consumption of the young while reducing that of the middle-aged.  Moreover, 
while in this paper the education tax rate is exogenous, this tax rate is likely linked to the weight that 
society places on the education of its youth.  Thus, in economies with low levels of altruism, aging is more 
likely to lead to decreases rather than increases in taxes to fund education.  Such a policy will raise 
consumption of the current generation of workers and thus current welfare to the detriment of future 
generations. 
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 Table 1 
Baseline Parameter Values 
for the Simulations 
Description Parameter Value 
Share of physical capital in output α 0.30 
Weight given to children’s human capital in utility δ 0.98 
Education tax rate ω 0.074
Social security replacement rate ξ 0.43 
Working age population growth rate n 0.508
Probability of reaching old age p 0.382
Elasticity of government education expenditures θ2 0.5 
Weight given to elderly in social welfare ν 5
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 Table 2 
Parameter Values for an Aging Economy 
Generation n(t) p(t) 
j-1 0.508 0.382 
j 0.508 0.424 
j+1 0.122 0.447 
j+2 0.049 0.482 
j+3 0.025 0.482 
j+4 0.025 0.482 
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 Table 3 
Long-run Growth Rate of Output Per Worker 
Scenario 
98.0
,5.02
=δ
=θ  
05.0
,5.02
=δ
=θ  
98.0
,1.02
=δ
=θ  
Baseline 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 
Aging Population 3.57 3.24 3.32 
Aging Population, ↑ω 3.93 3.60 3.30 
Aging Population, ↑ω, ↓ξ 4.17 3.82 3.59 
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Appendix  
Steady-State and Balanced Growth Solutions for physical and human capital and output. 
From (16) and (17) 
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When Z > 1 and θ1 + θ2 = 1, then k(t+1) > k(t) ∀ t and the economy converges to a balanced growth path; 
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when θ1 + θ2 < 1 the economy converges to a steady state.   
Along a balanced growth path or in steady state  
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ENDNOTES 
                                                     
1 See Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) for an extensive review of the literature on the interactions between 
education and Social Security. 
2 Pecchenino and Utendorf solve a similar model under general functional form assumptions.  As the results 
are not affected by the functional form assumptions we will assume specific functional forms throughout. 
3 While other models endogenize both expenditures on children and bequests, e.g. Nishimura and Zhang 
(1992, 1995), they assume that income and interest rates are exogenous.  In our model, where wages and 
interest rates are endogenous, introducing an end-of-life bequest motive makes the analysis intractable. 
4 The assumption of unintentional rather than altruistic bequests is consistent with empirical findings by 
numerous researchers as summarized by Hurd (1990).  Laitner and Juster (1996) find support for 
intergenerational altruism but note that it is not the major explanation for saving. 
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5 Assuming exogenous fertility and an altruistic bond between parents and their children runs counter to the 
empirical findings of Cigno and Rosati (1996).  They find that parents are self-interested and choose their 
saving and fertility decisions without regard to their offspring.  Given the similarities between our model 
and Pecchenino and Utendorf (1999), we believe that if we removed the altruistic bond between parents and 
children and funded education via intergenerational education loans, our results would continue to hold.  
Our model further differs from Barro (1974) and other dynastic models, such as Ehrlich and Lui (1991), in 
which parents internalize the lifetime utility of their children.  In these models the effects of changes in 
taxes are negated via changes in bequests, and so are ill-suited to analyzing social security or publicly 
funded education.  Our formulation is similar to the parent child utility linkage assumed in Boldrin (1993).  
We adopt it so that we can study the effects of changes in expected longevity on social security and 
education taxes in response to demographic changes. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
6 The following propositions provide sufficient conditions for all the key endogenous variables to rise or fall 
together with an increase in an exogenous variables.  Weaker necessary conditions can be found that enable 
the comparative static/dynamic effects for the individual endogenous variables to be signed.  These 
conditions are stated explicitly in the appendix.  For the case of balanced growth the necessary and 
sufficient conditions coincide. 
7 A social security program may also be optimal in an economy with generation specific shocks.  However, 
such a system would require the possibility of transfers from workers to retirees and vice versa.  See Rangel 
and Zeckhauser (1999).  Since existing social security programs do not allow for such transfers, we assume 
that social welfare considerations prevail. 
8 See the Committee on Ways and Means (1998), table 1-17,  page 27. 
9 The data for n and p are taken from the Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and 
Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 1999. 
10 The rise in education expenditures precedes the rise in Social Security expenditures. 
11 Although the analysis in the text is with respect to an increase in ω from .074 to 0.10 and a decrease in ξ 
from 0.43 to 0.33 this result generalizes to any increase in ω and decrease in ξ. 
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